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AMMUNITION SAFETY MANAGEMENT
The international community has been actively engaged in mine action for over 20 years. 
Clearance has been remarkably successful both 
in reclaiming land and making life safer for some 
of the most disadvantaged people in the world. 
As the number of casualties due to landmines has 
fallen, we have seen the number of deaths and 
injuries caused by explosions in ammunition storage 
areas rise1 and an increasing diversion of 
ammunition away from state stockpiles and into the 
hands of non-state actors; the collapse of Libya in 
2011 for instance saw the loss of almost an entire 
state stockpile.
Poorly managed stockpiles of ammunition present 
two distinct threats to the wider community: the risk 
of an explosion within the stockpile and the risk of 
diversion. Explosions in ammunition storage areas are 
being reported at 2 per month worldwide2. This figure 
is based on reported incidents and the real number 
may be significantly higher. The effects of explosions 
in ammunition storage areas can be truly devastating 
with damage to property and infrastructure running in 
to billions of dollars3 and a human cost measured in 
shattered lives4.
Diversion could be described as a theft, or loss of 
ammunition that reduces the capability of the stockpile 
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Libya. Source Threat Resolution Ltd.
owner, usually the state, and allows military grade 
ammunition and explosives to be used by non-state 
actors. Military ammunition is in many countries the 
preferred main charge for use in improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs).
There are numerous issues to consider and 
procedures to follow when managing ammunition 
stockpiles, like any risk management strategies they 
are designed to reduce the likelihood of an accident 
and/or to reduce the consequences of such event. 
There are many factors that increase the risk of an 
explosion and they all need to be addressed. As a 
primary measure where ammunition is safe to move 
and where the situation allows, it should be moved 
away from people and vital infrastructure as soon as 
reasonably practicable. In the event of an ammunition 
storage explosion, this simple logistics activity will 
mitigate much of the potentially devastating effects.
Ammunition Safety Management is a broad subject 
and for brevity and readability we will focus on some of 
the major contributing factors to the explosive risk. The 
first three are broadly risk mitigation and the remaining 
four deal with accident prevention.
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• Stockpiled ammunition in or near populated centres.
• Quantity Distances and SOPs.
• Segregation of ammunition in storage by Hazard 
Divisions and Compatibility Groups.
• Segregation between serviceable and 
unserviceable ammunition.
• Unsafe and shelf life expired ammunition within the 
stockpile.
• Untrained and unsupervised personnel.
• Poor inventory control measures and lack of basic 
management.
Each of these factors represents a significant 
management challenge, which is still poorly understood 
by many states. Some of these challenges tie 
together and can be improved significantly with small 
investments into human and technical resources. It is 
the planning and prioritisation of ammunition safety 
management that is key to improving the situation 
and managing the explosive risk. We will now briefly 
introduce the above factors.
Stockpiled ammunition in populated areas.
Moving the ammunition away from people, property 
Lapua ammunition factory accident aftermath, Finland 1976.
and infrastructure is paramount. In order to accomplish 
this safely the ammunition must be inspected before 
transport and certified as ‘safe to move’. Ammunition 
that is not ‘safe to move’ must be destroyed in 
accordance with EOD drills and 
principles.
Quantity Distances. One of 
the easiest, cheapest and most 
effective means of protecting 
public and property from the 
effects of an explosion is by the 
use of separation distances. 
Quantity Distance (QD) tables 
are available that give minimum 
acceptable separation distance from a given quantity 
and type of ammunition to areas where the public may 
live, congregate, work or transit. Within the storage 
areas there should also be separation between 
storage locations to reduce the risk of an explosion 
propagating from one store to another. The adoption 
of, and adherence to, these QD will ensure that if an 
explosion occurs it will be limited to one location and 
the risk to the public is reduced to a tolerable level.
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Segregation of ammunition.  Ammunition   can 
be classified generically into Hazard Divisions (HD) 
by the major hazard that it poses in the event of an 
accident, be it mass explosion, fragmentation or a fire 
hazard.  Within each HD the 
ammunition is sub-divided into 
Compatibility Groups (CG) to 
determine which items can be 
stored and transported together. 
By adhering to HD, CG and 
approved mixing rules we can 
radically reduce the risk of an 
ammunition accident and lessen 
the effects should one occur.
Separation of serviceable and unserviceable 
ammunition. Unserviceable does not automatically 
mean unsafe.  The  term  ‘unserviceable’  covers 
a broad  spectrum  of  ammunition  from  an  item 
so unsafe it has to be destroyed in situ, through 
to ammunition that  is  apparently  perfect  in  all 
respects  but  fails to meet the specified performance 
parameters. Mixing the two categories will have 
implications such as decreasing war fighting capability 
... THE ADOPTION OF THE 
QUANTITY DISTANCES WILL 
ENSURE THAT IF AN 
EXPLOSION OCCURS THE RISK 
TO THE PUBLIC IS REDUCED TO 
A TOLERABLE LEVEL …
Libyan market for munitions. Source James Madison University.
and risking the safety of the entire stockpile, including 
all serviceable ammunition.
Unsafe and life expired stocks being retained. 
The safety of ammunition is not always immediately 
apparent and as ammunition degrades over time it 
may become unstable, increasing the likelihood of 
initiation in storage or whilst being moved. If stored 
with serviceable ammunition there is an increased risk 
of losing strategic stocks.
Untrained personnel.  Ammunition requires 
special handling and storage requirements.  All 
personnel working with ammunition must be aware of 
the risks and the associated safety precautions and 
procedures. Addressing these factors will reduce the 
risk of an ammunition accident occurring and limit the 
amount of ammunition involved as well as minimising 
the impact on people and property.
The other major risk posed by ammunition 
stockpiles is diversion.  Ammunition is a sought 
after commodity and in many countries the favoured 
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main charge in IEDs. Diversion may be small-scale 
and local, or large with national or even regional 
dimensions. 
Small-scale diversion is characteristically carried 
out by individuals or small groups. It may be a 
member of the security forces or an authorised worker 
with access to ammunition taking directly from the 
stockpile. This kind of theft typically takes place where 
security is lax, accounting procedures are inadequate 
and where there is poor supervision over the site 
and workforce. To counter diversion at this level the 
ammunition must be physically secured, access 
restricted and monitored, and the ammunition subject 
to strict accounting, regular stock checks and a clear 
audit trail. 
Examples of large-scale diversion include the 
former Soviet Union countries and more recently Iraq 
and Libya. Where accounting and accountability break 
down, diversion at grand scale may flourish. Without 
attempting to over-simplify the problem, the actions 
US Soldier in underground storage bunker near Tikrit, Iraq, 1st Sep 2003. Source NBC News.
required to address the diversion and proliferation of 
ammunition in grand scale are essentially the same 
in terms of restricting access, establishing accurate 
accounts and instilling accountability.
Further means of diversion include forced theft, 
mass looting or abandonment. At grassroots this might 
be an armed gang breaking in to an explosive store and 
stealing the ammunition; whilst at the larger scale, with 
a shifting frontline in a conflict area, the ammunition 
stockpile could be lost entirely. The need for physical 
security and an adequate security response at the 
lower level is a fundamental part of ammunition safety 
management. A secure building may not keep out well- 
equipped and determined attackers but it will slow 
them sufficiently for a co-ordinated security response 
to be mounted. Secure buildings, adequate monitoring 
through CCTV, regular patrols and a dedicated armed 
quick response force are the PS (Physical Security) 
component of appropriate PSSM. Whilst the loss of 
ammunition to wrong hands is more difficult to prevent 
in all settings, good management of the ammunition 
stockpile should ensure that only tactical, rather than 
strategic levels of stock are lost. 
Improving ammunition safety and security requires 
a change in mindset and a political will. The case is 
pertinent in both emerging and developed countries. 
Finland makes a good example, having suffered a 
series of ammunition explosions in storage areas 
and factories in the 1960s and 1970s5. The accident 
investigations pointed out that most of the explosions 
could have been avoided and that their impact could 
have reduced through implementation of relatively 
simple measures. This revelation prompted the 
Ministries of Defence and the Interior to reassess and 
redefine priorities. National standards for ammunition 
management were developed in the late 1970’s and 
updated in the 1980’s and 1990’s; training of both 
military and civil personnel was carried out; and a staff 
screening and qualification regime was established. 
Good practice guidance was sought and learnt 
from other countries, introduced to the ammunition 
industry and armed forces, and then standardised and 
monitored. It worked. Since the 1970’s and until early 
2015 only two explosive incidents have been recorded 
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in Finland’s manufacturing sites and none in storage 
locations, with no casualties or significant damage in 
either case.
In Finland today, large ammunition stockpiles have 
been reduced in size and explosive depots  have 
been modernised and life cycle managed, with much 
capacity now situated underground, resulting in a safe 
and secure system for storing ammunition in significant 
quantities. With the project due for completion in 
2018, the national effort will continue in neutralising 
the remaining explosive remnants (ERW) from World 
War II, inspecting and decommissioning expiring 
stocks, and procuring new ammunition to maintain the 
defence capability.
On the challenge of expired stocks, ammunition is 
never completely safe. Explosives are combinations 
of chemicals and these react with each other. 
Depending on the level of exposure to external 
conditions, these chemical processes slow down or 
Albanian ammunition store. Source GICHD.
accelerate. Regardless of the design of conventional 
ammunition, the means of triggering and initiation 
are simple mechanical-chemical or electric-chemical 
systems. By neglecting 
the basic requirements for 
storekeeping, it is entirely 
probable, and this likelihood 
increases over time, that 
badly kept ammunition will 
accidentally initiate one 
day, will fail to function as 
designed or will be stolen or 
be traded away. In addition, 
as ammunition gets too old 
and unstable it will prove 
more expensive to destroy 
as increased care and 
safety measures have to be applied throughout the 
disposal operation.
It is also worth killing a myth in the notion of 
unpredictability of ammunition. While it is true, that 
it is difficult to know what is going on inside an old 
artillery shell by simply looking at it, there are ways 
to rapidly verify the type of explosive in ammunition 
and with some more effort and techniques, to 
determine the level of deterioration in its components, 
including the condition of fuze(s). There is no magic 
in these processes, only science. By studying the 
history of storage, ammunition shelf life can be 
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determined as well as the anticipated effects 
on a type of munition over time due to altered 
packaging, temperature and humidity in the 
store location.
All this said, in most cases the lead cause 
of an explosion in a storage area is remarkably 
less technical and subject to external 
disturbance. Examples are sub-standard and 
old electrical installations, smoking and other 
spark-inducing activities, burning rubbish 
and packaging material near ammunition, a 
fire that started elsewhere and spread to the 
ammunition storage area, and so forth.
To summarise, there are numerous 
instances of continued malpractice in storing 
ammunition.  Ammunition is being stored alongside 
weapons, serviceable and unserviceable ammunition 
is being stored together and Hazard Classification 
Codes are being ignored. 
Abandoned and unexploded 
ordnance and quarrying 
explosives and accessories 
are in some places mixed in 
with the operational stock. 
Some armed forces continue 
to stockpile ammunition that 
has no corresponding, or 
functioning weapon system 
with which to fire it. These 
are not only bad practices, 
but, as history has shown 
us, they are also dangerous. 
Safe routines, standard operating procedures, 
supervision and discipline are called for.
There is plenty of technical guidance available. 
United Nation’s International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (2015) in French and English, UN 
Saferguard Web portal (UN ODA), OSCE’s Handbook 
of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2007), 
NATO’s AASTPs6  (2006), and British Joint Service 
Protocol  publications7 (e.g.  JSP482) are examples 
of complementary international guidance on good 
practice. Professional advisory services and training 
are also available to bridge the gap between the 
BY NEGLECTING THE BASIC 
REQUIREMENTS FOR STOREKEEPING, 
IT IS ENTIRELY PROBABLE THAT BADLY 
KEPT AMMUNITION WILL ACCIDENTALLY 
EXPLODE ONE DAY, WILL FAIL TO 
FUNCTION AS DESIGNED, WILL BE 
STOLEN, OR THEN BE TRADED AWAY
Ammunition Store in South Sudan, 2014. Source GICHD.
current state of ammunition affairs, and the minimum 
level of acceptable stockpile safety and security.
A properly managed ammunition stockpile has 
virtually no obsolete, unserviceable or surplus stock. 
It is kept safely away from people, accounted for 
correctly with a clear audit trail and stored in a secure 
location with regular inspections and stock checks. 
It requires trained, qualified and dedicated staff and 
a commitment to safety and accountability. With 
these people and procedures in place the risks and 
impact of ammunition accidents or diversion can be 
reduced to a negligible level that should be the goal 
of everyone involved in ammunition management. ■
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